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Abstract 
Recent technological advancements such as cloud based digital video recording services and 
advertisement-skipping services are threatening copyright holders’ business models more than ever. 
This paper introduces an economic model to analyze court rulings on the personal fair use of video 
recording technologies. Although personal video recorders might have been beneficial for copyright 
holders in the past, newer and more innovative information technologies have the potential to restrict 
copyright holders’ usual distribution channels, namely live airing and video on demand. By linking a 
law and economics approach with the characteristics of information technology, this paper provides a 
new perspective to explain the effects of copyright law on the business strategies of copyright holders 
under the threat of new kinds of information technologies. The court may have to consider adjusting 
the boundaries of fair use according to match such rapid technological development. Business 
managers should also be aware that this combination of legal rulings and information technology 
may create either benefits or disruptions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In March 2012, Dish Network Corp. (www.dish.com), a satellite TV provider, introduced an Auto-
hop feature that allows users to automatically skip commercials when playing recorded TV content 
using its Hopper DVR (digital video recorder)
1
. TV networks such as Fox, CBS, and NBC who holds 
the copyright of the broadcasted contents considered the service to be a threat to their business models, 
which they argued to be supported by advertising, and filed lawsuits against Dish in May 2012 for 
copyright infringement
2
. The court subsequently denied Fox’s request for a preliminary injunction 
against Auto-hop in November 2012. 
Copyright holders of TV contents have both legal barriers and technological barriers that can protect 
their profit and incentives to create, against PRSs since Betamax. Legal barriers are set by the court, 
by deciding what PRS is a fair use and what is not. Technological barriers can be categorized into 
three different factors which can deter viewers from using PRSs: quality loss when copying, the cost 
of copying (Miceli and Adelstein, 2005), and embedded advertising. Copyright holders have two 
major sources of income depending on the platform, namely indirect advertisement fees from live 
broadcasting and direct service fees from video on demand (VOD) services. Quality loss and the 
expensive cost of private copying help copyright holders by discouraging potential viewers from 
choosing a personal video recorder over their services. Embedded advertising forces viewers to watch 
advertisements even when the content is recorded, which allows copyright holders to convert such 
exposure into advertising revenue. However, recent advancements in information technology have 
challenged such barriers. DVRs have removed quality loss from personal recordings, while cloud 
based DVRs theoretically have a similar cost structure to that of VOD services. Moreover, the Auto-
hop feature removes embedded advertisements, while bringing up another legal dispute over fair use 
doctrine. As such barriers are being removed by information technology, it is clear that both 
lawmakers and managers of copyright holders are facing newer and different challenges. Therefore, it 
is imperative to analyze the legal, economic, and technological conditions that affect the interests of 
copyright holders and lawmakers in order to help them make better decisions. However, to the best of 
the author’s knowledge, no studies have yet linked these newer personal recording devices armed with 
innovative information technologies such as cloud based DVR and Auto-hop with a law and 
economics approach to elaborate on the implications for lawmakers and copyright holders.  
This paper suggests an economic model that captures disruptions from advancements of PRS 
technologies, from Betamax to cloud DVR and Auto-hop. The model shows the economic value of 
the fair use of TV content, the consequences of court decisions, and copyright holders’ strategies 
according to changes of PRS technologies. Research objectives are: 1) to review and compare how 
advancements of PRS technologies have changed TV content copyright holders’ profit, strategies, and 
social welfare under previous court rulings. 2) to explain how the newest PRS technologies can 
disrupt the balance between protecting social welfare and copyright holders’ incentives according to 
court’s expected decisions.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Fair use doctrine and related information technologies 
The fair use doctrine is one of the most controversial topics in the law and economics field. The 
Copyright Act established the concept of fair use, which allows for unauthorized copying if it 
improves the original work, including criticism, scholarship, news reporting, and education purposes. 
                                              
1 Bauder, David (2012-05-22). "Auto Hop Ad Zapper: Dish Network's New DVR Feature Has TV Networks Worried". 
Associated Press. Retrieved 2012-07-17. 
2 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-05/dish-s-ad-skip-tool-may-benefit-from-cablevision-dvr-case.html. 
However, such purposes should not substantially impair the copyright holder’s incentives to create the 
work, in this case the creation of TV content (Miceli and Adelstein, 2005). 
The degree of protection to be applied has always been disputed. Scholars such as Liebowitz (1985) 
and Boldrin and Levine (2002) have argued that a copyright holder can charge a higher price for the 
content to include the indirect benefits derived from unauthorized copies if it can price discriminate. 
However, some studies suggest that improvements in copying technology imply that the level of 
copyright protection may have to be increased (Adelstein and Peretz, 1985; Klein et al., 2002). 
From these arguments, understanding the performance and characteristics of the technologies used in 
fair use is essential to balancing the costs and benefits of the fair use ruling (Novos and Waldman, 
1984; Johnson, 1985; Besen, 1986). While Miceli and Adelstein (2005) claimed that the optimal level 
of fair use is determined by technology level, implying that the court may have to adjust its rulings as 
the performance and characteristics of technologies evolve. A copyright holder has two types of 
protection for their creations: legal and technological. Legal protection such as copyright laws 
safeguards incentives to create, while technological protection offers copyright holders a much better 
quality and cost structure when copying (Miceli and Adelstein, 2005). Therefore, legal and 
technological protection should work together to guarantee a copyright holder’s incentives without 
hampering social welfare. 
2.2 Platform strategies and competitive fair use services 
Copyright holders of TV contents like TV networks are often modeled as platform providers in a two-
sided market, since they often operate their own distribution channels such as TV broadcasting and 
VOD services. The copyright holder usually creates content and serve two different groups. One 
group of users is content viewers and the other is advertisers. By heavily subsidizing the viewers’ side, 
copyright holders derive better profits with the advertisers’ side through network effects (Armstrong, 
2006). Many studies have investigated platform providers’ strategies under different settings. For 
instance, various business models such as those including credit cards, broadband, videogames, media, 
and streaming services adopt similar strategies in order to maximize the benefits generated through 
network effects (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). However, a copyright holder’s strategy under direct 
competition with PRSs is not fully addressed.  
Other than live airing, copyright holders have another means of distributing their content. In the past, 
this was usually by releasing official versions of the content on physical media such as VHS or DVD. 
Since 1999, however, inexpensive Internet broadband connections have facilitated the development of 
VOD. Compared with official DVD releases, VOD has lower marginal production and distribution 
costs (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) and can be directly served from the copyright holder and/or 
sanctioned intermediaries such as Netflix and Amazon. VOD services are usually considered to 
operate under a revenue-sharing model because they offer copyrighted materials for profit purposes. 
Economides and Tåg (2012) extended Armstrong’s (2006) model to explain the pricing- and revenue-
sharing issues between VOD platform providers and copyright holders.  
For copyright holders, VOD is in direct competition with PRSs, as it has both time shifting and space 
shifting features, while indirect advertisement revenue can be turned into direct pricing. However, the 
fact that copyright holders have lost the legal battle until cloud DVR suggest that the copyright 
holders’ business model need to be re-examined under new technological and legal circumstances. 
3 MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
Suppose a group of viewers who want to watch TV content. Each viewer has a different ideal 
watching time, denoted as ti, uniformly distributed over [0,1]. In other words, transportation cost ti 
incurs if viewer i watches the content at a time that deviates from his or her ideal watching time. The 
content is broadcasted live at t=0. A viewer receives utility U0 (0 < U0 ≤ 1) if he or she watches the 
content at the ideal time. We assume that U0 does not decrease as time passes
3
. The content has 
embedded advertisements, which incurs fixed nuisance cost of CF to viewers (CF < U0)
4
.  
If a viewer watches the content and the embedded advertisements, the copyright holder charges the 
advertiser an advertisement fee denoted as f. This advertisement fee can be interpreted as advertisers’ 
willingness to pay or valuation for a single exposure of their advertisements. The valuation of the 
advertisement for the advertiser does not exceed the maximum possible utility from watching the 
content for a viewer (f < 1).  In addition, although the content is not substitutable for viewers, for 
advertisers it is assumed that there exists similar content that has available advertisement slots. 
Therefore, the advertisement fee f is assumed to be fixed by the market. 
3.1 Case 1: Live TV only 
In this case, it is assumed that no PRSs are available. Before Betamax was introduced in 1982, a 
viewer had to watch the content live or give up watching it at all if the transportation cost was too 
high. Therefore, a viewer’s utility function is defined as: 
 0i F iu U C t    (1) 
If ui > 0, viewer i watches the content live. Otherwise, he or she gives up watching. The number of 
live viewers, denoted as α, is: 
 
0 FU C    
The copyright holder’s profit function thus becomes: 
 ,1 0( )CP Ff f U C     (2) 
To derive social welfare, aggregated viewer’s welfare is expressed as: 
 2,1 0 0
0
( ) 1/ 2( )V F FU C t dt U C

       (3) 
Assuming that the advertisers get the exactly same marginal benefits as the marginal advertisement 
fee, the social welfare becomes: 
 ,1 0 0( )( 1/ 2( ))S F FU C f U C      (4) 
This case is the baseline of the following analysis. As more technologically advanced fair use PRSs 
are introduced to the market, more parameters and decisions must be modeled. 
3.2 Case 2: Betamax (imperfect recording technology) 
Betamax allowed viewers to record TV content onto magnetic tapes, which naturally degraded picture 
quality. Relative quality loss is denoted as σ (0 < σ <1), and the viewer now has two choices: Watch 
live or record and watch later. The viewer still has to watch the embedded advertisements, even with 
recordings. The fact that automatic advertisement skipping services such as Auto-hop are under legal 
dispute also suggests that copyright holders benefit from recorded advertisements in their revenues. 
We therefore assume that until automatic advertisement skipping services arrive, viewers watch 
embedded advertisements in their personal recordings in order to examine the impact of technological 
innovations clearly. Further, PRSs are ruled to be fair use, and viewers incur marginal recording cost 
CR if they decide to record and play later. PRS providers are assumed to be under perfect competition, 
therefore CR is set by the market. 
                                              
3 The contents considered in this paper represent movies and TV series, which are often watched years later. 
4 We follow Gabszewicz et al.’s (2001) assumptions that there is a limit on the amount of advertising embedded in content 
without harming it and that the viewers are indifferent to marginal changes in this amount..  
When a viewer watches recorded content at his or her ideal time, deviated from the original airing, it 
is assumed that advertising effectiveness decreases as time passes after the initial airing. Even though 
we assume that the utility from watching the content does not decreases over time, the value of 
embedded advertisements does
5
. In this model, advertising effectiveness thus decreases after its initial 
live airing and eventually becomes zero when the viewer that has the most distant ideal watching time 
(ti=1) watches the content. It is further assumed that advertising effectiveness is fully known to both 
the advertiser and the copyright holder and that an advertisement fee is collected according to total 
delivered advertisement effectiveness. 
A viewer’s choice is described by the following expressions, where ui,L is the utility function when the 
viewer watches the content live and ui,R is when the viewer records the content and watches it at his or 
her ideal time: 
 
, 0
, 0(1 )
i L F i
i R F R
u U C t
u U C C
  
   
 (5) 
In order to make any viewer choose recording services (ui,R ≥ 0), the maximum allowed quality loss is 
derived as: 
 
0
1 R FMAX
C C
U


   
In other words, if σ > σMAX, the recording service does not appeal to viewers at all. A viewer chooses 
to watch live when ui,L ≥ ui,R; otherwise, he or she records the content and watches it later. The 
number of live viewers (α) is derived as: 
 0 0R MAXU C        
The profit function of the copyright holder becomes: 
 
1
,2 (1 )CP f f t dt
     (6) 
Because the effectiveness of recorded advertisements declines after α, the advertisement fee reduces 
accordingly. When σ = σMAX, which may represent the performance of the first PRSs introduced into 
the market, the profit function can be simplified to 
 2,2, 01/ 2(1 ( ) )MAXCP FU C f     (7) 
It is clear that ,2, ,1MAXCP CP  . Thus, the copyright holder may enjoy additional profits from the 
recorded advertisements embedded in the content. Analysis suggests that even though copyright 
holders sued Sony for copyright infringement when Betamax was introduced, they may actually 
benefit from fair use PRSs.  
As the performance of PRSs increases (σ reduces to zero), the copyright holder’s profit decreases, 
since: 
 ,2 0 0( 1) 0CP R F
d
fU C C U
d
 

      (8) 
Our model is consistent with Miceli and Adelstein’s (2005) findings; in other words, as the quality of 
copied material under fair use increases, the copyright holder becomes worse off. 
Proposition 1: The copyright holder is better off with PRSs if its quality loss is at the allowed 
maximum; however, the copyright holder’s profit decreases as quality loss decreases. 
                                              
5 As advertisements often have time-sensitive content, such as temporary discount campaigns (Bitran and Mondschein, 
1997) and advertisers want to replace old advertisements with new ones if a competitor launches a new campaign (Sohn and 
Choi, 2001). 
When DVRs became available, the copyright holder’s profit function becomes: 
 2,2, 0 1/ 2( 1)CP Rf C     (9) 
Since σ=0 .This profit function is dependent on the marginal cost of personal recording. Although 
copyright holders may still cover the fixed cost of content creation if the cost of personal recording 
remains high, the threat is clear since the copyright holder could be worse off following the 
introduction of DVRs.  
To derive social welfare in this case, it is assumed that DVR is provided at the cost under perfect 
competition. For DVR, the number of live viewers is: 
 
RC   
The aggregated viewers’ welfare and social welfare is derived as: 
 
1
,2, 0 0 0
0
( ) ( )V F F RU C t dt U C C dt

 
          (10) 
 ,2, 0 ,2, 0 ,2, 0S CP V         (11) 
Comparing the social welfare with when VTR’s quality loss was the maximum yields: 
 ,2, 0 ,2, 0 01/ 2( )(2 ( 1)( ))MAXS S R F R FU C C f U C C            (12) 
Since f < 1 is assumed, the analysis suggests that if marginal recording cost is high enough (U0-CF > 
1-CR), loss of advertisement revenue may surpasses gain of viewer’s benefits from technological 
advancement, reducing overall social welfare. It is unlikely that the court can block technological 
advancement of personal recording services, however as Liebowitz (1981,1982,1984,1985) and 
Gorden (1982)  suggested, tehcnological improvement may hamper social welfare as it can make 
previous business models obsolete. By ruling Betamax technology as fair use, court may increased 
both copyright holder’s profit and social welfare, therefore serving the purpose of the fair use 
doctrine: better use of copyrighted material and protect copyright holders’ incentives. 
3.3 Case 3: Expensive DVR vs. Inexpensive VOD 
In this model, VOD services generate revenues for the copyright holder directly. Although many 
VOD services such as Netflix and Amazon are exist as distribution intermediaries, they must still be 
legally sanctioned by copyright holders in contrast to fair use PRSs, and therefore revenue sharing 
with the copyright holder is assumed
6
. 
A viewer now has three options: watch the content live, record and play later, or buy VOD. VOD is 
assumed to be provided without embedded advertisements; however, a price set by the copyright 
holder is directly charged to viewers. From a viewer’s perspective, because VOD and DVR provide 
the same picture quality at different prices, both services are direct competitors. However, VOD 
requires direct payment, while DVRs incur the marginal cost of recording and the nuisance cost of 
embedded advertisements. 
Traditional DVRs (i.e., before cloud DVR) had a different cost structure to that of VOD. When 
viewers used a traditional DVR, the recording service provider usually had to install the device, 
generating relatively large installation costs. Content was recorded on the local hard drives of 
traditional DVRs, which means that if more than one viewer wanted to record the same content, it 
may be duplicated among viewers. Further, hard drive size was another limitation of traditional DVRs.  
                                              
6 We also argue that official DVD releases have the same business model as that of VOD releases, only with different launch 
timings. Copyright holders usually release official DVDs after a full season has ended, while VOD content is often available 
after just 24 hours. 
Therefore, in this section VOD is modeled as being more competitive than traditional DVR, because 
VOD does not require such costs, which may reflect the early stages of the DVR and VOD battle. 
The copyright holder decides both the price and the launch time of VOD, denoted as PV and tV, 
respectively. The marginal cost for the VOD service is denoted as CV. In this section, the DVR is 
assumed to be a recording service that has a higher marginal recording cost relative to the cost of 
using VOD services, which satisfies: 
 1/ 2( )R V V FC P t C    (13) 
The viewer who pays the highest cost for choosing VOD over live TV has a transportation cost of 
1/ 2( - )V V FP t C . Therefore, if the marginal cost of recording exceeds the cost of using VOD 
services ( ( -1/ 2( - ))V V V V F R FP t P t C C C    ), no viewers choose DVR since a viewer simply 
selects the lowest curve available.  
A viewer whose ideal time is close to the live airing would choose to watch the content live, because 
of the relatively small transportation cost incurred. As the transportation cost increases both using 
DVR and buying VOD becomes cost effective, such viewers give up watching live and choose to 
watch the content at the ideal time. In this case, the marginal cost of recording (CR+CF) is somewhat 
higher than the sum of the fee for VOD (PV) and the VOD transportation cost because of the lateness 
of launch (ti-tV, ti < tV). This condition removes the option to use DVR technology. Therefore, a 
viewer’s utility functions are now defined as: 
 
, 0
, 0
, 0
, 0
( )                 when ( )
                                 when ( )
i L F i
i R F R
i V V V i V i
i V V V i
u U C t
u U C C
u U P t t t t
u U P t t
  
  
    
  
   (14) 
where ui,V are utility functions when the viewer watches the content via VOD. The number of live 
viewers (α) is derived as: 
 1/ 2( )V V FP t C      
In this case, because no viewers choose DVR over VOD, the profit function of the copyright holder 
becomes: 
 
1
,3( , ) ( )
V
CP V V V V
t
P t f P C dt       (15) 
where CV is the marginal cost of the VOD service. 
The copyright holder can freely set the price of VOD and its launch timing as long as the condition 
stated in expression (13) holds. To find the optimal VOD price and launch timing, first- and second-
order conditions are derived as: 
 
2
2
2
ˆ2
1
( 2 +2) 0
2
1
( ( )) | 0
2 V V
CP CP
F V V V
V V
CP CP
V V P P
V V
C C P f t
P P
f P C
t t
 
 

 
     
 
 
   
 
   (16) 
The second derivative of launch timing at given VOD price is negative. Therefore the best launch 
timing for the copyright holder is launch immediately or do not launch at all. For both cases, the 
optimal prices of VOD are determined from the first order conditions: 
 0 1
1 1ˆ ˆ| (2 2) | ( 1)
3 2V V
V t F V V t F VP C C f P C C f          (17) 
Comparison of profit of the copyright holder for both cases yields:  
 2,3 0 ,0 ,3 1 ,1
ˆ ˆ( | , ) ( | , ) 7 / 72(1 ) 0
V VCP V t V CP V t V F V
P t P t f C C           (18) 
Therefore, if DVR is expensive, immediate launch of VOD is the best for the copyright holder and the 
optimal VOD price is set to: 
 0
ˆ | 1/ 3(2 2)
VV t F V
P C C f        (19) 
If VOD services have better cost structure than personal recording services, the copyright holder 
should launch the VOD immediately and the optimal VOD price exists to maximize the profit, 
balancing indirect advertisement fee and direct VOD revenue.  
Proposition 2: If DVR has expensive marginal recording cost for viewers ( 1/ 2( )R V V FC P t C    ), 
it is best for the copyright holder to launch VOD immediately and optimal VOD price exists 
( ˆ 1/ 3(2 2)V F VP C C f      ). 
If personal recording services have relatively worse cost structure due to installation cost, duplicated 
local storage and upgrade costs, the copyright holder may able to enjoy both advertisement fee and 
VOD revenue by setting optimal VOD price and launch timing.  
To simplify comparison of the copyright holder’s profit between the case 2 and this case, let the 
quality loss as zero (σ=0) and the marginal cost of serving VOD is negligible (CV<<CR, CV=0). 
 
,3 2 ,3, 0 ,2, 0
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 
 
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 

  (20) 
Therefore the copyright holder gets more profit than the case 2, when the value of the embedded 
advertisement is smaller than the maximum possible utility from the content (f <1) and the marginal 
cost of serving VOD is negligible (CV=0). This clearly shows that the copyright holder is enjoying the 
newly erected technological barrier, VOD, and taking advantage of relatively efficient cost structure 
of VOD in comparison with traditional fair use PRSs. 
Social welfare is also increases in this case, because both the viewers and the copyright holder get 
benefits from more efficient technology. The aggregated viewers’ welfare and social welfare in this 
case are derived as: 
 
1
,3 0 0
0
ˆ( ) ( )V F VU C t dt U P dt


        (21) 
 ,3 ,3 ,3S CP V     (22) 
Again, assuming f <1 and CV=0, the comparison of social welfare between this case and DVR-only 
case simplifies to: 
 2,3 ,2, 0 1/18(1 )(5 (5 ) ) 0S S F Ff C C f f           (23) 
The results shows that even when the copyright holder is taking advantage from VOD’s better cost 
structure and enjoying monopolistic position over the time-shifting services, the social welfare can be 
better off since VOD technology works better for both viewers and the copyright holders. The court 
still allowed PRSs as fair use, however, VOD serves as a better fair use technology for the viewers. In 
this case the technology worked well for both viewers and the copyright holders, for viewers can 
enjoy copyrighted materials better and it also protected copyright holder’s incentives for creation, 
without the court’s intervention to balance fair use. 
3.4 Case 4: Cloud DVR vs. VOD 
Cloud DVR (often referred as Remote Storage DVR or network DVR) services store personal video 
recordings in a central server and play content over a broadband network. Therefore, it is assumed 
that the marginal service cost for PRSs is significantly lowered and can match the price of VOD 
services
7
.  
From a legal perspective, Cloud DVR works in the same way as does a traditional VCR, which has 
been ruled to be fair use. However, from a business perspective, Cloud DVR works in the same way 
as does VOD. The differences in two perspectives yield different results relative to the previous cases. 
In this case, the marginal cost of recording is low enough to threaten the VOD price and does not 
satisfy the condition specified in expression (13), which means that: 
 1/ 2( )R V V FC P t C      (24) 
Although a viewer’s number of available options do not change, setting the price of VOD and its 
launch timing becomes more complicated for the copyright holder. A viewer is assumed to choose 
VOD over cloud DVR when the perceived cost is the same. If the price of VOD is higher than the 
marginal cost of recording (
V R FP C C  ), no viewers will choose VOD over cloud DVR. However, 
if the price of VOD is lower than the marginal cost of recording ( V R FP C C  ), the launch timing is 
fast enough to satisfy expression (13), and we return to the previous case. Moreover, if the price of 
VOD is lower than the marginal cost of recording (
V R FP C C  ) and the launch timing is slow 
enough to satisfy inequality (24), the copyright holder’s profit is worse off than when setting the price 
of VOD to be the same as the marginal cost of recording. Therefore, the price of VOD is fixed at the 
marginal cost of recording in this case ( V R FP C C  ).  
Since the price of VOD is fixed, advertising is relatively more valuable to the copyright holder; 
therefore, it may be possible to delay the VOD launch to maximize advertising revenue, even if the 
advertisements are recorded. The number of live viewers in this case is derived as: 
 RC    
Because V R FP C C  , the copyright holder’s profit function becomes: 
 
1
,3 (1 ) ( )
V
V
t
CP V V
t
f f t dt P C dt

          (25) 
The optimal launch timing (tV) is decided by the first-order condition because the second-order 
derivative is negative: 
 ˆ(1 ) 1CP R F VV V R F V
V
d C C C
f t C C C t
dt f
  
          (26) 
In the previous case, it was preferable for the copyright holder to set the launch timing to be 
immediate and set the optimal VOD price. However, control over the VOD price diminishes in this 
case and only the launch timing remains. If the advertisement fee is high enough, then the copyright 
holder should delay launch timing in order to benefit from the recorded advertisements. 
Proposition 3: If DVR has a competitive marginal recording cost for viewers 
( 1/ 2( )R V V FC P t C   ), it is preferable for the copyright holder to fix the VOD price at the 
marginal cost of personal recording ( V R FP C C  ) and set the optimal VOD launch timing 
( ˆ 1 ( / )V R F Vt C C C f    ). 
                                              
7 For example, new could DVR services such as Boxee TV introduced unlimited amount of recordings for a usual monthly 
fee. 
As information technology advances and upgrades fair use PRSs, the copyright holder’s control over 
its own copyrighted material diminishes and embedded advertisements are important to revenue 
generation
8
. 
As cloud DVR becomes cheaper, the copyright holder’s profit decreases, because: 
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
 
          (27) 
If the cost of cloud DVR continuously decreases, it will eventually become the same as the cost of 
serving VOD, since the cost structure is the same. We further assume that cloud DVR and VOD have 
the same cost structure (CV=CR), to simplify the analysis of social welfare. 
The aggregated viewers’ welfare and social welfare in this case are derived as: 
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
            (28) 
 ,4 ,4 ,4S CP V     (29) 
As the marginal recording cost decreases, the social welfare and the copyright holder’s profit may 
show opposite direction. 
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The social welfare increases as the marginal recording cost decreases, once the marginal recording 
cost gone below a certain level ( 1/ (1 )RC f   ). If the embedded advertisements are valuable for 
society, losing them by cloud DVR may not be so attractive. Otherwise, inexpensive cloud DVR is 
good for society because it increases the viewer’s welfare, since competition is good for society.  
However, the copyright holder’s profit only decreases as the marginal recording cost decreases and it 
may not protect incentives for creation eventually. Therefore, comparing the copyright holder’s profit 
with that of case 2 yields: 
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The above expression should be positive in order to protect incentives for the copyright holder. The 
profit loss from competition, represented by the second term, should be small enough to preserve 
copyright holder’s incentives.  
The importance of introduction of cloud DVR technology is that for the first time allowing PRS 
technology as a fair use may fail to achieve its goal: protecting copyright holder’s incentive and 
maintain social welfare. Unlike previous cases, the fair use doctrine must be used with greater caution 
in this case, since with cloud DVR there is a possibility that allowing the new PRS as a fair use may 
fail to protect the copyright holder’s incentives for creation even the social welfare can increase by 
new technologies. The court already allowed cloud DVR as a fair use, however the court may have to 
watch closely as the marginal recording cost of cloud DVR is likely to decrease and the decision may 
have to be reviewed. 
                                              
8 According to CNET, Fox Networks recently increased the limits on web access to its shows from 24 hours to eight days . It 
is hard to say that this adjustment reflects the threat from cloud DVR, however, delaying the VOD launch may suggest that 
copyright holders are receiving insufficient advertisement revenues and taking the relevant actions to protect them. 
3.5 Case 5: Non-free Auto-Hop vs. VOD 
In this case, a new parameter is introduced to model automatic advertisement skipping (k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1). 
If k=0, Auto-hop is ruled to be fair use and all advertisements in the content are skipped. It is assumed 
that for now to automatically skip advertisement the viewers must pay additional fee which is exactly 
same amount as the nuisance cost, and servicing Auto-hop requires certain amount of cost for the PRS 
provider
9
. 
Viewers’ utility functions do not change, since they pay the same cost for watching embedded 
advertisements and for using the Auto-hop service. The copyright holder’s profit function thus 
becomes: 
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If 0 < k < 1, the optimal launch timing is derived as: 
 ˆ(1 ) , 1CP R F VV V R F V
V
d C C C
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dt fk
  
        (33) 
which is similar to the previous case. If k decreases, the launch timing should be hastened because of 
loss of advertisement exposure in the recorded content. 
When k=0, the first-order derivative becomes: 
 ( )CP V R F
V
d
C C C
dt

    (34) 
The first-order derivative is negative because the marginal cost of producing VOD assumed not to 
exceed the marginal cost of personal recording. This means that if Auto-hop is ruled to be fair use, the 
copyright holder must launch VOD immediately after the initial airing. 
Proposition 4: If DVR has an inexpensive marginal recording cost for viewers 
( 1/ 2( )R V V FC P t C   ) and automatic advertisement skipping is ruled to be fair use, the copyright 
holder must fix the VOD price at the marginal cost of personal recording ( V R FP C C  ) and launch 
VOD immediately after the initial airing. 
If the court decides that Auto-hop is fair use in the current series of lawsuits, the copyright holder has 
little control over its content’s redistribution. The price of VOD is fixed at the cost of marginal 
recording and the optimal launch timing is set to be immediate because embedded advertisements 
cannot be exploited anymore. Comparing the copyright holder’s profit with the previous case yields: 
 2,5 ,4 1/ 2 ( ) 0CP CP F Rf C f C f         (35) 
Also if it is assumed that auto-hop service is provided at the cost, the social welfare decreases as 
introduction of auto-hop, since the comparison shows: 
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 (36) 
The difference in social welfare is same with that of the copyright holder’s profit, since the viewers’ 
welfare did not change. Because it is assumed that Auto-hop service still incurs certain cost, the PRS 
                                              
9 While Dish is arguing that Auto-hop feature is provided free of charge, understandable because it is just a function from 
included software, however it still only work with Dish’s Hopper DVR, which costs about $4 more than standard DVR.  
providers cannot have profit from providing Auto-hop. The technological advancement pushes both 
recording service providers and the copyright holder, both parties loses opportunities of making a 
profit. By allowing Auto-hop as a fair use, the court may fail to preserve both the copyright holder’s 
incentives and social welfare. 
3.6 Case 6: Free Auto-Hop vs. VOD 
If Auto-hop service is fully integrated into cloud DVR technologies, which we assume that happen 
soon enough if Auto-hop is ruled as a fair use, then Auto-hop does not require any specific hardware 
or operating system therefore can be provided with no marginal cost. In this case, the viewers’ utility 
functions when using PRS changes to: 
 , 0i R Ru U C   (37) 
Since the copyright holder should set the price of VOD at the marginal cost of recording less the 
nuisance cost. The number of live viewers (α) becomes: 
 
R FC C    
Because the embedded advertisements are gone, the viewers are more likely to use time-shifting 
services. 
The comparison of the copyright holder’s profit in this case with non-free Auto-hop service yields: 
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Again, the profit of the copyright holder further decreases as Auto-hop is provided free since the cost 
of the recording is smaller than the maximum possible utility from the content. The chance of 
preserving fixed cost for creation becomes slimmer. For the social welfare the comparison becomes: 
 ,6 ,5 1/ 2 ( 2 )S S F FC C f     (39) 
Because the viewers are enjoying advertisement-free time shifting services, gain from reduced 
nuisance cost clearly benefits the viewers. However, for society, the gain from reduced nuisance cost 
should much higher than the loss from advertisement revenues (CF > 2f).  
Proposition 5: If Auto-hop service is provided as free of charge, the copyright holder’s profit reduces 
( ,6 ,5 ( 1 ) 0CP CP F RC f C         ) and the social welfare can be better off only if the nuisance 
cost of watching advertisements is much larger than the advertisement fee ( 2FC f ). 
Although there is still a chance that free of charge Auto-hop service can be beneficial to the society, 
however it is unlikely since the requirement is quite unrealistic. The removal of viewers’ nuisance 
cost can be argued as “substantial noninfringing use10”, especially for Dish. The model suggests that if 
the society gains more benefits from removed nuisance costs than loss of copyright holder’s profit, 
Auto hop may be ruled as a fair use. The court should investigate possible development of de-
embedding technology and consider how such developments can affect both the copyright holder’s 
business model and the social welfare. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This paper examined the history of the technological development of PRSs, which are pushing the 
limit of definition of personal fair use, and investigated the relative strategies for copyright holders 
                                              
10 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sony_Corp._of_America_v._Universal_City_Studios,_Inc.#The_majority_opinion 
from a law and economics perspective. The presented model linked the economic perspective of fair 
use with the characteristics of the information technologies used in both fair use PRSs and VOD 
services sanctioned by the copyright holder. Law and economics approaches have thus far not yet 
captured the recent radical development in information technology in this field, while the MIS 
literature did not fully considered the threat from fair use rulings. We therefore suggest that this paper 
is a valuable addition to the current body of knowledge by bridging both perspectives and suggesting 
new approaches when analyzing copyright holder’ strategies. 
The presented analysis showed that technological development of PRS has greatly affected both 
copyright holder’s profit and social welfare. The following table summarized the findings. 
 
Available 
technology  
Copyright 
holder’s profit 
Social 
welfare 
Court 
decision 
Notes 
Betamax VCR Likely to 
Increase 
Increase Fair use Due to increase of exposure of embedded 
advertisements via recording 
Expensive DVR 
VOD 
Increase Increase Fair use 
(assumed) 
Copyright holder may freely set both price 
and launch timing of VOD 
Cloud DVR 
VOD 
Decrease Likely to 
increase 
Fair use Copyright holder must fix VOD price to 
match competition 
Auto-hop 
VOD 
Decrease Likely to 
decrease 
Under 
debate 
Copyright holder must fix both VOD price 
and launch timing to match competition 
Social welfare may decrease unless nuisance 
cost of watching advertisement are very high 
Table 1. Summary of analysis results 
We suggest that for cloud DVR, the court may have to investigate the price competition between PRS 
and VOD to make better assignment of fair use doctrine. For Auto-hop services, The court may have 
to compare the cost of serving Auto-hop feature and viewers aggregated nuisance costs from 
advertisement, to decide whether to allow Auto-hop as fair use or not. Miceli and Adelstein’s (2006) 
findings suggest that the cost of personal recordings can affect copyright holder’s benefits and in this 
paper, such considerations extended further with embedded advertisements and countermeasures like 
VOD. Copyright holders chose VOD over embedded advertisements in recorded contents when cost 
of PRS is high, and delayed VOD launch to utilize embedded advertisements more when cost of PRS 
become lower. Finally Auto-hop removed both ways of countermeasures against PRS from copyright 
holders. 
This paper has several limitations and directions for future research. The model only considered time-
invariant content such as movies or TV series. For time-sensitive content, VOD should function better 
than PRSs, thus favoring the copyright holder. Further, although the cost of designating what content 
should be recorded is represented in the marginal cost of recording, such a simplification may not be 
enough to offer implications to lawyers. Future research might look to introduce additional behavior 
models to consider such arguments. Viewers’ recordings may have complementary value for live 
broadcastings, in the case that a viewer expects to watch the content repeatedly in the future. By 
implementing parameters that capture heterogeneity in complementarities in viewers’ valuation, the 
extended model may produce additional implications. Making the advertisement fee as endogenous 
decision leads to two-sided market extension of the suggested model, and it may change the dynamics 
of interactions between copyright holder, viewers and PRS providers.  
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